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RESPONSIBILITIES OF A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE ATTORNEY
Gerald B. Lefcourt*
Our perspective as criminal defense lawyers is often based on
a pivotal experience. Mine was as a law school honors program
participant, sent to work with Legal Aid Society lawyers-New
York City's public defenders. I was assigned to help a young law-
yer handling arraignments. In New York City that meant a daily
crush of cases. His job was to seek bail as each defendant entered
the system. In disgusting pens holding as many as forty prisoners, I
would interview clients. I was the first person many prisoners saw
after they had spent up to four days waiting to appear before the
court.
The holding pens were filled with huddling defendants, most
of whom were standing because there was only one bench. Vir-
tually the entire population of the pens was nonwhite and poor,
without the resources or stable families to allow them bail. Most
were in shock or panic, yelling questions and begging for help.
"What am I charged with?" "When will I ever get out?" "Can you
call my mother?" "What if I didn't do it; will they still keep me?"
"Will you call my boss because if I don't show up I'll lose my job?"
I came to see that most of them were not really represented at
all. Not only would they not make bail, but most would ultimately
plead guilty to something, anything, just to move out of the system.
I realized that with a lawyer who had a few days to spend with the
client instead of a few minutes, a proper fight could be waged,
both to get the defendant out on bail and ultimately, to get a fa-
vorable disposition. In many cases defendants would not have
ended up with criminal records, a millstone that serves to keep the
underclasses as underclasses.
I realized that the Legal Aid attorneys, like their counterparts
across the country, were not properly trained, had no resources,
and were, frankly, overwhelmed. The number of defendants was
* J.D., Law Offices of Lefcourt & Dratel, P.C., New York City, New York.
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so great that there was no time for the niceties of an interview long
enough to establish any relationship, much less one of trust.
So, there were two systems operating, one for the wealthy who
had the resources to seek vindication of their rights and one for the
rest of society, left haphazardly to lawyers who could ensure en-
tirely less predictable results.
It was obvious that a system promising the right to counsel
was a farce. As a result of this experience, I abandoned my inten-
tion to use my law degree in some lucrative enterprise and instead
chose to focus on the criminal justice system. I became involved in
the successful effort to unionize Legal Aid Society lawyers, which
resulted in a revolution in the quality of representation of the poor
in New York and spread across the nation as well. Notwithstand-
ing success in other matters over the years, I feel this was the most
important contribution of my life.
In twenty-five years of practice, I have seen all sides of the
criminal defense bar. I have represented indigent defendants ac-
cused of killing police officers, college protesters accused of violat-
ing student codes, politicians accused of corruption, and wealthy
professionals accused of sophisticated financial crimes. The fact is,
in some ways, it is always the same. I truly believe that my re-
sponsibility as a lawyer to a client is the same no matter who the
defendant and no matter what the crime, and I endeavor to dis-
charge that responsibility as zealously as possible for all.
Society expects a lot from us, all the while bashing us in every
possible way. Under the Sixth Amendment we are expected to
provide the criminal defendant with a rigorous defense undivided
by conflicts.' At the same time, in many cases we must fight with
judges and prosecutors just to get paid out of frozen funds. We
have to worry about whether we will be subpoenaed or have our
law offices searched. We have to worry about whether the gov-
ernment is secretly courting our clients to turn against us. And we
are told by our friends and by the media that we should not be rep-
resenting guilty defendants.
These are all situations that drive wedges between our clients
and our solemn responsibilities. How do we handle this? What
are our fundamental obligations?
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (holding that a defendant's right to counsel includes protec-
tion from attorney's conflicts of interest).
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I. RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE CLIENT
First and foremost, defense attorneys must zealously and un-
compromisingly represent the client.2 They must do so with all
their ability and creativity, within the bounds of law. Defense at-
torneys must accept this duty as sacrosanct and be prepared to do
whatever it takes to improve the client's position. That means
they may have to offend. They may have to do the uncomfortable
thing. They may have to have prosecutors and judges think of
them as "the other," not one of them.
Of course, paramount is making use of one's own good judg-
ment. While defense attorneys must take into consideration what
the client wants, it is the lawyer's judgment that is being offered to
the client, and the lawyer must not be afraid to use it. Defense
counsel must be both an advisor and an advocate with courage and
devotion. Indeed, some have described the role as a "learned
friend," often the only one to whom a criminal defendant may turn
in total confidence. The defendant needs counsel to evaluate the
risks and advantages of alternative courses of action. But the de-
fendant also needs a broad and comprehensive approach to the
predicament.
Devoted service to the client does raise the issue of whether
the attorney must do whatever the client wants. I believe that we
must allow the client to make informed decisions about all matters,
including strategy. An informed and participatin client is a criti-
cal component of discharging our responsibilities. That is not the
same thing as doing something illegal, and a lawyer should leave a
case if a serious conflict arises. If defense counsel is truly repulsed
by the client, the lawyer should not represent the individual. Law-
yers are not busses, and they are not obligated to stop at every
stop.
We often hear that there must be "emotional detachment"
from a client. This is impossible to achieve. An "emotionally de-
tached" lawyer winds up supporting the government's view of the
defendant as a guilty and revolting person. Indeed "Wall Street"
lawyers identify with IBM and Microsoft, and prosecutors see
themselves as personally allied with the government, so why
should we not be expected to form the same attachment?
Representing an innocent client is an easy situation for the
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1994).
3. Id. Rule 1.4 cmt.
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public to support. In practice it is the hardest because of the over-
whelming fear of loss. A factually guilty client, where guilt is ap-
parent, raises society's challenge to the defense attorney: "How
can you go into court knowing your client is guilty and try to get
him or her off?" If this is a problem for you, you should not be a
defense attorney. The committed defense attorney must be pre-
pared to ensure that before the government takes away the client's
liberty, the process of doing so is fair and true. Defense attorneys
are not advocates for crime. They are as interested as anyone in a
safe environment in which to live and raise their families. But they
are, or should be, overwhelmingly interested in making sure that
the government deprives no one of liberty without doing so consis-
tent with the law. Otherwise, the government is just another thug
interfering with a citizen's freedom.
There are many situations that cause the "factually guilty"
defendant to seek a trial. Alternatives to trial are often unaccept-
able, particularly where the potential penalty is so harsh that trial
is solely an effort to avoid a life or even death sentence. In that
situation, or where the client refuses to seek an alternative and
wants his or her day in court, the trial is an opportunity for the de-
fense to passionately "keep the government honest." Justice
White described the role of defense counsel this way in United
States v. Wade:4
[D]efense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascer-
tain or present the truth. Our system assigns him a differ-
ent mission .... Defense counsel need present nothing,
even if he knows what the truth is. He need not furnish
any witnesses to the police, or reveal any confidences of
his client, or furnish any other information to help the
prosecution's case. If he can confuse a witness, even a
truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, un-
sure or indecisive, that will be his normal course. Our in-
terest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put
the State to its proof, to put the State's case in the worst
possible light, regardless of what he thinks or knows to be
the truth. Undoubtedly there are some limits which de-
fense counsel must observe but more often than not, de-
fense counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness,
and impeach him if he can, even if he thinks the witness is
4. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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telling the truth, just as he will attempt to destroy a wit-
ness who he thinks is lying. In this respect, as part of our
modified adversary system and as part of the duty im-
posed on the most honorable defense counsel, we counte-
nance or require conduct which in many instances has lit-
tle, if any, relation to the search for truth.5
Defense attorneys are meant to test the reliability and veracity
of the government's evidence, ensuring that the client's rights are
protected. This is healthy for a system that desires guilty convic-
tions only on substantial evidence professionally obtained, which
comfortably reaches the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. RESPONSIBILITY TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Responsible defense attorneys must take as their obligation
the role of champion of constitutional rights. It is unfortunately
true that only those who are close to criminal law understand the
effect such policies as the "war on drugs" have on the Bill of
Rights. From this involvement, one can see the threat such poli-
cies pose to our Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to
the Constitution and learn just how precarious those rights really
are.
There is a cynical joke among defense lawyers that a "liberal"
is a conservative who has been accused of a crime. Time and time
again, I have seen the transformation of former conservatives-
bankers, stockbrokers, lawyers, accountants, successful business-
men-who, having been charged with a crime, are amazed and
amazed again at the system. At every step, from arrest through
jail term, the prosecution and the police now have undue control
over the entire process. With sentencing guidelines, which render
judicial discretion a thing of the past, authority to seek Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations charges or money launder-
ing charges, and the ability to seek forfeiture of all assets-
including attorneys fees-are both now with the prosecutor, not
the judge.
Nor do I believe that the legislatures ever intended this state
of affairs. What made sense in one context has simply been
pushed beyond anyone's expectations. Take, for instance, the for-
5. Id. at 256-58 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
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feiture laws. In the 1970s the idea emerged that convicted defen-
dants should not be able to serve their sentences and then enjoy
their "ill gotten gains." Today, we have in excess of 100 federal
forfeiture statutes. Instead of taking away the "ill gotten gains"
from those convicted of crimes, three-quarters of all forfeitures are
civil, with no underlying criminal conviction.7 And what is being
taken? Recently, the Supreme Court approved the forfeiture of a
woman's automobile because her husband had sex with a prosti-
tute in the car.8 Here is a reasonable notion run out of control be-
cause of a failure to remember basic rights. Laurence Tribe once
wrote of the "tyranny of small decisions."9 Ten years ago the car
forfeiture case would never have been decided as it was. But, after
years of small steps urged by prosecutors, the perverse seems rea-
sonable.
Another example is what has become of the Federal Bail Re-
form Act of 1984.1 Although the Eighth Amendment guarantees
freedom from "excessive bail,"" the law was a response to cries
that defendants who were clearly a danger to the community were
being released on bail awaiting trial.' Now, any defendant a
prosecutor wants detained, often in order to exact the defendant's
cooperation, is detained. That is very far from the Framers' intent.
The Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, 3 developed by
the Supreme Court more than eighty years ago to deter agents
from acting illegally, 4 has been chipped away by judicial excep-
tions. It has eroded to the point where courts issue so few supres-
sion orders that most defense attorneys believe suppression hear-
ings are a hoax where courts pretend to be following the
Constitution but really look the other way. In one four-year pe-
7. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imprex Co., 473 U.S. 479,499 n.16 (1985).
8. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S.Ct. 994 (1996). The automobile subjected to for-
feiture in this case was jointly owned by the husband and wife. Id. at 996.
9. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-20, at 381 (2d
ed. 1988).
10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1996).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
12. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 permits the judicial officer to detain a criminal
defendant, for a period of not more than ten days, if "such person may flee or pose a
danger to any other person of the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(2).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. Anne Clark, The Exclusionary Rule, 84 GEO. L.J. 873 (1996); Potter Stewart,
The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the




riod the Second Circuit did not affirm a single suppression order.
Given the current practice of attacking judges who issue such or-
ders, few judges will chance public disgrace.
Defense attorneys must be vigilant in identifying those cases
that will result in encroachment on our liberties and result in the
expansion of government powers. We must accept the basic tenet
that government power will occupy any opening it gets. We there-
fore must be there with amicus briefs, lobbying and educating.
There is no other natural lobby for the protection of our
rights. Criminal defendants are neither interested nor in a position
to do it. Politicians will not do it. Journalists do not understand
how to do it. It is criminal defense attorneys who must keep track
over time of where we started, what our fundamental rights are,
and how they are threatened daily.
III. RESPONSIBILITY TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Defense attorneys must assume an activist role in the educa-
tion of the public. They must participate in the public debate of
cases, proposed statutes, and the system. The public is deluged
daily with stories that feed harsh laws and violations of fundamen-
tal rights. Defense attorneys must remind the public of the impor-
tance of the adversarial process. The public must understand that
defendants are entitled to the highest quality defense. Lawyers in
the United States are, in fact, more involved with great social and
political issues than are lawyers in almost any other country. In
England, for example, the Bar is a "club," remote from the con-
cerns and passions of ordinary life. Here, lawyers have fueled civil
rights causes and antiwar efforts. Many lawyers now work for the
public interest. Many large firms undertake significant pro bono
efforts on behalf of a variety of issues and causes. 5 But there must
be more.
Today, the nature of communications media-the way we
communicate with the public-is very complex. There is so much
going on, and so much information out there, that it is difficult to
engage in meaningful debate on any one issue. Keeping the public
focused on a particular proposal, while politicians spouting clever
15. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (1995); Tom
Shoenberg, The Ups and Downs of Pro Bono, LEGAL TIMES, June 24, 1996, at S37;
Vera Titunik, Big-Firm Pro Bono, All Over the Map, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, July-
Aug. 1995 (Supp.), at 24.
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sound bites seem to make it all so simple, is a daunting task. But
we must fight the pandering to the legitimate fears of the public
and continue to participate in the debate.
Recently Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole as-
serted that "[t]he president must be on the side of victims."16 It
sounds great, but what does it mean? In response President Clin-
ton hastily proposed a constitutional amendment for "Victims
Rights., 17 It contains an array of clauses seriously changing the
system as we know it. For example, a victim should have the right
to address the jury." What of cross-examination? What of the
rules of evidence? How will hysterical spectacles keep juries fo-
cused on their solemn duty of requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt? No one but defense counsel cares.
To capitalize on the public's fear of crime, proposals are hast-
ily made. Both parties support them in an effort to look "tough on
crime." The notions that we must protect against the innocent
being convicted and that proceedings must be solemn searches for
justice and fairness are lost. We cannot rely on the media to ex-
plain this phenomenon. Defense attorneys must come forward
and disclose the dangers that this political pandering can cause to
the concepts of justice, which we embrace as a nation.
That innocent people are convicted commonly, even for seri-
ous crimes, is no longer anecdotal. Earlier this year the Justice
Department's National Institute of Justice published a pamphlet
entitled Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science.19 It reports on
twenty-eight recent instances where it was shown by convincing
scientific tests that convicted defendants were absolutely excluded
from the class of potential perpetrators of the crimes.0 Indeed, in
one recent case four defendants, two on death row, who had been
16. Fred Brown, Dole Talks Tough in Aurora: Crime Program Outlined, DENY.
POST, May 29, 1996, at A01.
17. S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong. (1996); see 142 CONG. REC. S3795 (daily ed. Apr.
22, 1996) (Senator Kyl introducing the joint resolution); see also John M. Broder,
Clinton Calls for Victims' Rights in Constitution, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1996, at Al;
John F. Harris, Clinton Backs Crime Victims' Amendment, WASH. POST, June 26,
1996, at Al.
18. S.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong. (1996); see 142 CONG. REC. S3795 (daily ed. Apr.
22, 1996) (Senator Kyl introducing the joint resolution).
19. EDWARD CONNERS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE:
CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER
TRIAL (1996).
20. Id. at 2.
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in prison for eighteen years, were all found to be innocent . Un-
der recent changes in the law of habeas corpus, two of the defen-
dants would long ago have been executed.22
To be effective in this new era of Democrats and Republicans
trying to outdo each other on how "tough on crime" they can be,
defense lawyer associations must consider a new approach to
dealing with the media and the legislatures. Laws are enacted
quickly and slyly. The defense bar must acquire media skills to
change bad laws and educate the public.
A case in point was the prosecution of John W. Hinckley, Jr.,
for shooting President Reagan.2 Hinckley was acquitted by reason
of insanity. That caused a public uproar. Politicians used the op-
portunity to garner media attention and earn points. They fought
each other for media attention, each one screaming louder than
the other that Hinckley "got off" because of the insanity defense,
and that it had to be changed. Hinckley would escape punishment
because of a "legal technicality." No one mentioned that the ac-
quittal bought Hinckley a life sentence in a secure facility for the
criminally insane. Politicians demanded a shifting of the burden of
proof to the defendant claiming insanity, rather than the prior rule
that the prosecution was obliged to disprove it. A tidal wave
changed the insanity defense in both federal and many state
courts.2 And no one remembers that Hinckley remains to this day
in a prison hospital.
The nature of how evidence is gathered for prosecution has
been seriously threatened by the increase in sentences in the last
ten years. For example, by increasing the length of sentences,
routine cases now result in sentences of twenty years or more
21. Andrew Fegelman, 3 Convicted of Murders Are Finally Exonerated-No
Apology as Judge Dismisses 1978 Case, CH. TRIB., July 3, 1996, § 1, at 1, 14; Don
Terry, DNA Tests and a Confession Set Three on the Path to Freedom in 1978 Mur-
ders, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1996, § 1, at 6. The fourth defendant had been released
on bond earlier in 1996 when the Illinois Supreme Court overturned his conviction
and ordered a new trial because a witness had committed perjury. Id.
22. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1214.
23. United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981).
24. United States v. Hinckley, Crim. No. 81-306 (D.D.C. June 21, 1982) (order
acquitting Hinckley by reason of insanity); see United States v. Hinckley, 721 F.
Supp. 323,323 (D.D.C. 1989).
25. See JoHN KAPLAN & ROBERT WEISBERG, CRIMINAL LAW 909-10 (2d ed.
1991).
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without parole.2' Not only has this dramatic sentencing inflation
swelled prison populations, it has also threatened the concept of a
fair trial, or any trial at all.
To avoid these virtual life sentences, defendants have learned
that the only salvation is "playing the game." The "game" is to
help the government by "cooperating" against others. The game
must be played, even when there is no cooperation to provide. In-
stead, in case after case, witnesses provide untruthful testimony in
order to gain favor with the prosecutor who controls their free-
dom. Indeed, shading the truth to impress the prosecutor is only
the tip of it-outright perjury is now the order of the day.
What is the bottom line? It is the process that is important. If
the procedures we put in place to decide whether to take freedom,
and even life, from an accused are not fair and just, then the sys-
tem becomes the wrongdoer. We should want the same for others
that we would for ourselves and our children if we were accused of
a crime: a competent defense lawyer, a smart and fair judge, a
prosecutor who has been trained to seek justice and not just to
win, and rules that are fair so that we can honestly live with the re-
sult, whatever it is.
Unfortunately the union at the Legal Aid Society I helped
form twenty-six years ago is under attack. Under the contract the-
ory of defense, New York, like other locales, is attempting to save
money by contracting out defense work. One hundred thousand
dollars for 100 cases sounds good, but that is only $1000 per case.
The quality of defense counsel for the indigent and for all is up to
US.
26. Michael G. Turner et al., "Three Strikes and You're Out" Legislation: A Na-
tional Assessment, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1995, at 16.
[Vol. 30:59
